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Dispatch notifies police that John Doe is walking erratically down the
middle of a busy street. At the scene, police quickly identify John, arrest
him, and transport him to the county jail.  During this initial contact, the 
arresting officers immediately notice John’s irregular breathing, dilated
pupils, pale and sweat covered face, and white saliva around his mouth.
The booking process reveals John’s history of substance abuse and preexisting 
health complications.  Despite indications John will experience a dangerous
and painful withdrawal process, jail staff place John in a padded cell and 
do not order a medical exam.  John then experiences twenty-four hours of 
excruciating pain until the various bodily changes involved in drug withdrawals 
exacerbate his preexisting health condition.  John begs the staff for help, 
but they do not call for medical assistance.  When jail staff find him 
unconscious the following day and transport him to the hospital, it is too
late. He dies a week later.1 
Unfortunately, John’s story occurs frequently in the United States, and 
recent trends predict future increases in contact between addicted detainees 
and the prison system.2  In 2014, alcohol and drug abuse caused 8.5% of 
the deaths in local jails, and 1.4% of the deaths in state prisons.3  About 
25% of the country’s inmates depend on or abuse opioids.4  In California
prisons, drug and alcohol overdoses increased 113% between 2015 and 2018, 
1. See Villarreal v. County of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174–75 (N.D. 
Cal. 2017). This hypothetical is based on the facts of Villarreal, where officers detained 
Lara Gillis for over twenty-four hours and ignored her cries for help as she underwent 
medically unsupervised drug withdrawals in a county jail cell.  See id.  The withdrawal 
process aggravated her preexisting infection and caused lethal organ failure.  Id. 
2. See Michael Linden et al., Prisoners as Patients: The Opioid Epidemic,
Medication-Assisted Treatment, and the Eighth Amendment, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 252, 
252 (2018).  One study indicates state and federal reforms will reduce prescription opioid use; 
however, increases in illicit opioid use may outweigh these gains.  See Michael Devitt, 
Research Shows the Nation’s Opioid Epidemic Is Far from Over, AM. ACAD. FAM. 
PHYSICIANS (Feb. 20, 2019, 8:42 AM), https://www.aafp.org/news/health-of-the-public/
20190220opioidprojections.html [https://perma.cc/T93W-EWTE].  Restricting prescriptions
will likely cause addicts to turn to more dangerous, illicit opioids.  See id.  Without serious 
policy changes, annual opioid-related deaths could rise to 82,000 by 2025.  Id.  The study 
predicts more than 579,000 opioid-related deaths between 2016 and 2025, with 86% of these 
deaths attributable to illicit opioids.  Id. 
 3. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 257. 
4. See Erick Trickey, How the Smallest State is Defeating America’s Biggest Addiction 
Crisis, POLITICO (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/25/
rhode-island-opioids-inmates-219594 [https://perma.cc/FS3X-CFYT].  According to the
National Institute on Drug Abuse, 65% of the American prison population has a substance 
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with much of the increase attributed to the opioid crisis.5  When police 
detain an opioid addict without any treatment or monitoring, they risk 
subjecting the person to suffering and death.6 
John’s civil claim against the county jail would rely on a three-part legal 
theory: (1) the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment;7 
(2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides individuals with a civil remedy when state 
and local governments violate a constitutional right;8 (3) the Supreme 
Court in Estelle v. Gamble held that deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.9  John’s case would hinge on whether drug addiction and
withdrawals constituted a serious medical need, such that the jail’s deliberate 
indifference to his condition violated the Eighth Amendment.10  This Comment
addresses the possible barrier to John’s claim—the uncertain status of 
addiction as a serious medical need under the Eighth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court employs a flawed framework for evaluating whether a
particular state practice constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.11  The
Court’s examination of a practice like forcing addicted detainees to withdraw 
“cold turkey” hinges on an objective question: does the practice fall below 
society’s evolving standards of decency?12  Some federal courts interpret 
5. Megan Cassidy, Overdoses in California Prisons Up 113% in Three Years, S.F. 
CHRON. (May 5, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Overdoses-in-California-
prisons-up-113-in-three-13819811.php [https://perma.cc/XL5D-YNXF]. For more detail 
on the opioid crisis’ increasing presence in prisons, see generally Emily Vaughn, Opioid
Addiction in Jails: An Anthropologist’s Perspective, NPR (Nov. 12, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/11/12/777586941/opioid-addiction-in-
jails-an-anthropologists-perspective [https://perma.cc/4PTT-YVB5].
6. See COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., GONE BUT NOT FORGOTTEN: THE UNTOLD STORIES 
OF JAIL DEATHS IN WASHINGTON 2–3 (2019), https://columbialegal.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/05/Gone-But-Not-Forgotten-May2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9SX-X939].
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
9. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  Pretrial detainees like John must 
sue under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; however, the court’s actual 
legal analysis will revolve around Eighth Amendment interpretation.  See Castro v. County 
of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2016). 
10. See Villarreal v. County of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 
2017).
11. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 339–45 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The
evolving standards of decency would uphold practices like the execution of child rapists, 
if a majority of states allowed the practice.  See John F. Stinneford, Evolving Away from 
Evolving Standards of Decency, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 88 (2010). 
12. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 101–02. 
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society’s standards as having sufficiently advanced to classify addiction 
as a serious medical need.13  Other federal courts interpret these standards 
as not having sufficiently advanced.14 
The problem with tethering Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to societal 
standards is twofold: (1) courts exploit the ambiguous guidelines for 
interpreting these standards to rule based on their own policy preferences;15 
and (2) societal standards can evolve in a direction that tolerates cruel and 
unusual punishments for certain detainees, or condemns practices well 
outside the Eighth Amendment’s scope.16  The Seventh Circuit and lower 
courts in the Ninth Circuit definitively placed drug addiction under Eighth 
Amendment protection,17 while the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
repudiated this categorization.18  Remedying the circuit split on whether
addiction constitutes a serious medical condition requires more than a new 
deliberate indifference test.19  The Supreme Court should place deliberate
indifference to detainee addiction under Eighth Amendment protection 
13. See, e.g., Villarreal, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1184 (holding drug addiction constituted 
a serious medical need); Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 948 
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding drug addiction constituted a serious medical need); Foelker v.
Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding opioid addiction constituted a 
serious medical need). 
14. See Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2012)
(finding addiction to powerful painkillers did not constitute a serious medical need); see 
also Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding decedent’s addiction to 
PCP did not constitute a serious medical need, and to classify it as such “would be a 
startling step to take”). 
15. For example, compare the Foelker and Bruederle opinions, where an Obama 
appointee and a Bush appointee came to opposite conclusions despite very similar facts, 
with the Foelker judge sympathizing with the addict and the Bruederle judge sympathizing 
with law enforcement.  Compare Foelker, 394 F.3d at 513 (holding drug addiction constituted 
a serious medical need), with Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 777 (holding drug addiction did not 
constitute a serious medical need). 
16. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, State Legislatures and Solving the Eighth Amendment 
Ratchet Puzzle, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 677, 697–98 (2018).  Contemporary societal standards 
can condone punishments that the Founders viewed as cruel and unusual when they drafted 
the Eighth Amendment.  See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
17. See Foelker, 394 F.3d at 513; Villarreal, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1174; Hernandez, 
110 F. Supp. 3d at 948. 
18. See Grayson, 195 F.3d at 696; Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 777; Burnette v. Taylor,
533 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008). 
19. See Haley Loutfy, Health Care Behind Bars: Constructing a Uniform Deliberate
Indifference Standard to Prevent the Use of Eighth Amendment as Broad Prison Reform, 
45 LINCOLN L. REV. 77, 95 (2018) (suggesting a modified deliberate indifference test).  
The Supreme Court could adopt the Ninth Circuit’s test for evaluating serious medical 
needs.  See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992).  However, these 
tests would not solve the root problem in the Supreme Court’s reliance on evolving standards 
of decency and could force courts to protect every medical condition under the Eighth 
Amendment.  See discussion infra Section IV.B.2. 
456
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and simultaneously depart from its evolving standards of decency rule.20 
The historical rationale behind the Eighth Amendment supports a return
to the objective question of whether wanton infliction of pain occurred,
without considering whether a sufficient majority of the body politic deems 
a particular condition worthy of protection.21 
This Comment will provide (1) the Eighth Amendment’s original meaning 
with regard to passive deprivations; (2) the Supreme Court’s shift from wanton
and unnecessary infliction of pain to evolving standards of decency; (3) a 
critique of the evolving standards rule; and (4) a solution that eliminates 
the evolving standards rule, returns to the question of wanton and unnecessary 
infliction of pain, and recommends legislative reforms states should make 
in response. 
II. A BROAD ORIGINAL MEANING
Several important historical events helped spur the Founders to create 
the Eighth Amendment.  These events demonstrate a wider scope of potential 
cruel and unusual punishments than the Supreme Court initially identified 
in the nineteenth century.22 
The American Founders behind the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
had in mind historical cases encompassing a wide range of punishments, 
including passive punishments that inflicted pain through deprivation.23 
20. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 89–90 (discussing how a return to the
Eighth Amendment’s original meaning would insulate the amendment’s interpretation 
from volatile public opinion while effectively protecting against severe abuses in the 
criminal justice system).  This return would also remedy the practical and constitutional issues 
with the Supreme Court’s modern Eighth Amendment interpretation, although it would 
come at the expense of some protections for prison conditions.  See Jeffrey D. Bukowski, 
Comment, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the Prohibition Against 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases Is Not Beyond the Bounds 
of History and Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419, 437 (1995). 
21. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340–45 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s
departure from the Eighth Amendment’s original meaning necessitated the problematic 
evolving standards rule). 
22. Courts in the nineteenth century narrowly construed the Eighth Amendment to
prohibit only the worst forms of punishment.  See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135– 
37 (1878) (finding the Eighth Amendment prohibited barbarous punishments resembling 
torture).  However, the Founders likely considered a wide range of punishments when they 
penned the Eighth Amendment, including subjecting prisoners to harrowing prison conditions.  
But see LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 231–37 (1999). 
23. See The HMS Jersey, HIST. (Mar. 19, 2010), https://www.history.com/topics/
american-revolution/the-hms-jersey [https://perma.cc/55E8-U77E]; Abraham Holmes,
 457




   
 




   
 
 
   
 
     
 
    
   
   
  
 
The Founders and reformers before them identified instances of both
active torture and passive neglect as particularly cruel and unusual.24 The
rationale behind the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, as discussed 
and interpreted in Wilkerson, indicates the Founders sought to proscribe 
practices that subjected detainees to “terror, pain, or disgrace.”25 
The Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles and Gregg v. Georgia adopted the 
evolving standards rule because it found the historical Eighth Amendment 
interpretation too rigid to sufficiently curtail government abuses.26  However,
from sixteenth century England to the time of the American founding, 
reformers took a wide view of potentially cruel and unusual practices, 
condemning and gradually eliminating those that inflicted disproportionate, 
arbitrary, or unnecessary pain and suffering on detainees.27  For the purposes
of this Comment, active infliction of pain generally involves torture or 
beatings, while passive infliction of pain generally involves deprivation 
and neglect.28 
The Founders behind the Eighth Amendment considered a wide variety
of practices when they proscribed cruel and unusual punishment.29 The
Tudor monarchy sanctioned numerous grotesque forms of torture and execution, 
including the “rack” in the Tower of London.30  Robert Beale, an advisor 
Judicial Power, Address Before the Massachusetts Convention on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution (Jan. 30, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 109, 111 (Jonathan Elliot 
ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1901); LEVY, supra note 22, at 232–37. 
24. See Timothy J. Compeau, Prisoners of War, WASHINGTON LIBR., https://www.
mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/prisoners-of-war/ [https://
perma.cc/2XKD-4DRG]; Abraham Holmes, supra note 23, at 11; LEVY, supra note 22, at 
232–37. 
25. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135 (discussing how English monarchs frequently
interceded to remove the “ignominious and more painful” aspects of a proscribed punishment, 
and how this practice inspired the Eighth Amendment). 
26. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (recognizing the Eighth Amendment’s 
scope is “not static”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (finding the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits more than “barbarous” punishments when interpreted in a “flexible 
and dynamic manner”).
27. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–37 (finding that at the time of the founding, 
American courts upheld barbaric punishments like hanging, drawing, and quartering, but 
increasingly declined to prescribe these sentences in a general spirit of leniency). 
28. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, adopted Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (recognizing the distinction between “torture” and “cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment”). 
29. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–36 (listing several “atrocities” the English
committed in punishing criminals, including dragging them to the place of execution, drawing 
and quartering, public dissection, and burning alive; noting “it is safe to affirm” the Eighth 
Amendment generally targeted torture and “unnecessary cruelty”). 
30. Geoffrey Abbott, Rack, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Aug. 9, 2007), https:// 
www.britannica.com/technology/rack-torture-instrument [https://perma.cc/M8PG-9P6Y];
see LEVY, supra note 22, at 234. 
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to King James I, condemned royal use of the rack, calling the practice
“cruel, barbarous, contrary to law, and unto the liberty of English subjects.”31 
In 1615, the Court of King’s Bench declared that throwing a man into a 
dungeon with no bed or food for criticizing an officer of the crown represented 
an “unlawful or extreme” punishment.32  In its condemnation of depriving
the man of food and water, the Court of King’s Bench acknowledged that 
passive cruelty inflicts just as much pain and suffering as active cruelty, 
and should be similarly protected against.33 
The cruel and unusual language in the English Bill of Rights may have 
referenced the actions of Lord Chief Justice George Jeffreys, who notoriously
sentenced 841 prisoners to slavery in the West Indies for no less than ten 
years.34  The case of Titus Oates similarly influenced the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause.35  As punishment for Oates’s act of perjury, the English 
court stripped Oates of his religious title, fined him 2,000 marks, ordered 
him to be whipped continuously as he walked three and a half miles, then 
placed in the stocks four times every year, and imprisoned for life.36 When
Parliament subsequently debated and upheld his sentence in 1689, the 
dissenting lords described the punishment as barbarous, inhuman, unchristian, 
and unjust.37  Parliament then drafted the punishment provision in the 
31. LEVY, supra note 22, at 232 (quoting 1 THE LIFE AND ACTS OF JOHN WHITGIFT,
D.D. 402 (John Strype ed., 1792)). 
32. Id.  In another contemporary case, English authorities arrested a man for murder 
and held him in a dungeon without food or light and forced him to lie in a coffin.  ARTHUR 
GRIFFITHS, THE CHRONICLES OF NEWGATE 181 (1884). 
33. See LEVY, supra note 22 at 232.  In the 1615 case Hodges v. Humkin, the King’s
Bench applied the Magna Carta’s prohibition on the “malicious kind of imprisonment,” 
reflecting a longstanding concern with prison deprivations dating back to the thirteenth 
century.  See Hodges v. Humkin (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016; 2 Bulstrode Rep. 139, 
140. The King’s Bench took issue with Hodges’s being “thrown into a dungeon, and 
so to be there kept, without any bed to lie on, or any bread or meat to eat.”  Id. 
 34. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 234.  Jeffreys handed down both the enslavement 
and Oates judgments, and his draconian views on criminal punishment were widely publicized.  
See Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original 
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 854–57 (1969); see also LEVY, supra note 22, at 234. 
35. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 236.  Titus Oates falsely accused several Catholic
clergymen of treason, resulting in their executions.  Id.  He subsequently stood trial for 
perjury, where the court could not issue a death sentence because the perjury was not a 
capital offense.  Id.  The dissenters in the House of Lords who sought to overturn the sentence 
made the first recorded use of “cruel and unusual punishment” to describe Oates’s sentence.  
See Granucci, supra note 34, at 859. 
36. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 236–37. 
37. Id. at 237. Levy argues the Oates case most likely influenced the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause because Parliament debated the case the same year it passed 
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English Bill of Rights that same year.38 This wide variety of punishments
informed Parliament’s drafting of the cruel and unusual clause, the direct 
precursor to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in the Eighth 
Amendment.39 
The proposed American Constitution endeavored to create a strong 
central, federal government with limited powers.40  At the Massachusetts
Ratifying Convention, Abraham Holmes criticized the new government’s 
ability to create and punish federal crimes without restraints preventing it 
from “inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments” that would 
make “racks and gibbets” seem mild in comparison.41  Holmes referenced 
Tudor England with “racks and gibbets,” and made another historical reference 
to the “diabolical” Spanish Inquisition.42  The Spanish Inquisition began
in 1478 and endured through the time of the American founding.43  Spanish
law forbade drawing blood and mutilation, thus torturers alternatively 
inflicted pain by pulling prisoners’ arms with ropes until they dislocated, 
forcing prisoners to ingest water, and stretching them on the rack.44  The
inquisitors designed these techniques to inflict pain without permanently 
damaging the victim’s body.45 Holmes’s invocation of the Spanish Inquisition’s
the English Bill of Rights. Id. In Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized
the influence of the Oates case on the Eighth Amendment, arguing the amendment’s
original scope and power “will be found portrayed in the reasons assigned by the members 
of the House of Lords who dissented against two judgments for perjury entered in the
King’s bench against Titus Oates.”  217 U.S. 349, 390 (1910) (White, J., dissenting) (citing 
12 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 447 (T.B. Howell ed., 1812)).
38. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 237. 
39. See Cruel and Unusual Punishments, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law. 
cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-8/cruel-and-unusual-punishments [https://perma.cc/
J5HV-N64N] (“It is clear from some of the complaints about the absence of a bill of rights 
including a guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments in the ratifying conventions 
that tortures and barbarous punishments were much on the minds of the complainants, but 
the English history which led to the inclusion of a predecessor provision in the Bill of Rights of
1689 indicates additional concern with arbitrary and disproportionate punishments.”). 
40. See Holmes, supra note 23, at 111. 
41. Id.
 42. Id.
43. Edward A. Ryan, Spanish Inquisition, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (May 28, 
2015), https://www.britannica.com/technology/rack-torture-instrument [https://perma.cc/ 
WDH2-A2RK].
44. See RAFAEL SABATINI, TORQUEMADA AND THE SPANISH INQUISITION: A HISTORY
106–07, 134–35, 190 (2003). The Inquisition followed a grotesque political theory that 
pain begets loyal subjects: “The Inquisition and its procedures look, above all, like a 
system of social control.  Nothing seems more coercive than raw power, exerted by means 
of pain. Pain influences people effectively; it rams the collective will down the throat of 
its victims.”  ARIEL GLUCKLICH, SACRED PAIN: HURTING THE BODY FOR THE SAKE OF THE 
SOUL 172 (2001). 
45. See SABATINI, supra note 44, at 190. 
460
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torture practices indicates the Founders understood the Constitution should
protect detainees from all forms of torture. 
British prison ships during the Revolutionary War represented the most 
recent example of cruel and unusual punishment for the Founders.  An 
estimated 11,000 American prisoners died aboard decommissioned British 
ships during the Revolutionary War, primarily from disease and malnutrition.46 
Under these conditions, prisoners aboard the HMS Jersey died at a rate 
of twelve per night.47  One prisoner who spent two years aboard a British 
prison ship wrote to his family, “[c]ould I draw the curtain from before 
you; there expose to your view a lean Jaw.  [M]ortal hunger laid his skinny 
hand and whet to keenest Edge his stomach cravings, surrounded with 
tattered garments, Rotten Raggs close beset with unwelcomed vermin.”48 
In denying these detainees food, sanitation, and medical care, the British 
subjected them to daily agony through systematic deprivation.49 
George Mathews served in the Continental Army until his capture and
imprisonment in the HMS Jersey.50  Mathews survived his imprisonment
and eventually attended Georgia’s convention to ratify the U.S. Constitution.51 
The suffering and death from designed neglect on the prison ships made 
a lasting impression in the minds of the Founders from Mathews to George 
Washington.52 Washington led negotiations to free prisoners of war aboard
British prison ships and personally warned a British general about the 
inhumane conditions.53  The massive loss of life and horrific experiences
in the bellies of British prison ships provided the Founders with ample 
46. See The HMS Jersey, supra note 23 (describing British prison ships as “[o]ne of
the most gruesome chapters in the story of America’s struggle for independence from 
Britain”). 
47. See id.
 48. HARRY R. STILES, LETTERS FROM THE PRISONS AND PRISON-SHIPS OF THE
REVOLUTION 11 (1865). 
49. See, e.g., id.
 50. See G. Melvin Herndon, George Mathews, Frontier Patriot, 77 VA. MAG. HIST.
& BIOGRAPHY 307, 308 (1969). 
51. See GEORGE R. LAMPLUGH, POLITICS ON THE PERIPHERY: FACTIONS AND PARTIES IN
GEORGIA, 1783–1806, at 64–65 (1986). 
52. See Compeau, supra note 24. 
53. Id. George Washington warned the British general that “[o]bligation arising
from the Rights of Humanity, and claims of Rank are universally binding, and extensive . . . .”  
Id. (quoting Letter from George Washington to Thomas Gage, in 3 GEORGE WASHINGTON 
PAPERS 4 (Richard Varick ed., Aug. 11, 1775), https://www.loc.gov/resource/mgw3e.001/ 
?sp=4 [https://perma.cc/55KD-8DDW]. 
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motivation to prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, in its active and 
passive forms.54 
III. FROM WANTON INFLICTION OF PAIN TO EVOLVING STANDARDS
Before the Supreme Court’s adoption of the evolving standards rule in
1958, the Court construed the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of 
the Eighth Amendment to protect against the wanton infliction of pain and 
suffering.55  These earlier cases relied on the Eighth Amendment’s history 
as a prohibition on torture and practices that resemble torture.56  During 
the latter half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court decided the Eighth 
Amendment should protect inmates from all possible abuses, as opposed 
to only those involving severe pain or risk of death.57 
An 1852 Utah statute provided that persons convicted of capital offenses
could be shot to death.58  In 1878, the Supreme Court evaluated whether 
the Eighth Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual punishment 
rendered that statute unconstitutional.59  Ultimately, the Court upheld the
state’s use of a firing squad to execute capital offenders, but it took the 
opportunity to opine on the original meaning and spirit behind the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause.60 While common law provided for many
severe punishments at the time of the American founding, contemporary 
courts often declined to carry them out.61  Therefore, the Cruel and Unusual
54. At Virginia’s ratifying convention, Patrick Henry warned that without a 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, Congress could “introduce the practice of 
France, Spain, and Germany of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime.  They will 
say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and 
they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government that 
they must have a criminal equity . . . .”  See Patrick Henry, Speech Before Virginia Ratifying 
Convention (June 5, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 299, 301 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827), https://oll-
resources.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/oll3/store/titles/1907/Elliot_1314-03_EBk_v6.0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DE4Y-3LRF].
55. See Bukowski, supra note 20, at 422–23. 
56. See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (finding punishments 
violated the Eighth Amendment when they involved torture or a lingering death). 
57. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). 
58. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 130 (1878). 
59. Id. In Wilkerson, the Court confined its analysis to the constitutionality of the 
manner of inflicting death, and not the death penalty itself.  See Bukowski supra note 20, 
at 423. 
60. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–37. After Wilkerson, Utah used the firing squad for
executions for 125 years, abandoning the practice in 2004.  See Utah Brings Back Firing 
Squad Executions, NPR (Apr. 5, 2015 7:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2015/04/05/39 7672199/ 
utah-brings-back-firing-squad-executions-witnesses-recall-the-last-one [https://perma.cc/
W4TK-U36A].  Utah reinstated the firing squad in 2015, becoming the only state in the 
United States to employ the method of execution.  Id. 
 61. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135. 
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Punishment Clause generally proscribed any unnecessarily cruel practices 
that inflict “terror, pain, or disgrace.”62  “[T]error, pain, or disgrace” encompass
the wide range of potential cruel and unusual punishments indicated in the 
clause’s conception.63  The Court did not, however, tether its analysis to
any notions of evolving societal decency.64  Even when the Court expanded 
Eighth Amendment protection in 1910 to include punishments disproportionate 
to the underlying crime, it relied on the amendment’s historical meaning 
and precedent caselaw.65 
The evolving standards rule permits courts to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment in a “flexible and dynamic manner” that conforms to progressing 
societal attitudes toward a particular punishment.66  The Supreme Court
first invoked the evolving standards rule with regard to the Eighth
Amendment in Trop.67  Here, the Court considered whether denationalization 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.68  A military court convicted 
the petitioner of desertion and removed his American citizenship, pursuant to 
a federal statute.69  The Court found denationalization disproportionately 
62. Id.
 63. Id. at 135–36. While later courts could have broadly interpreted the “terror, 
pain, or disgrace” from Wilkerson, they maintained a narrow interpretation focused on 
particularly barbarous practices.  See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). 
64. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135–37. 
65. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371–72, 375–76 (1910). 
66. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976). The evolving standards rule permitted
the Court to apply constitutional principles “to a much wider set of circumstances than 
those which first gave rise to those principles.”  Bukowski supra note 20, at 423. 
67. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society.”).  The Court determined the Eighth Amendment’s limited language 
necessitated an adaptable meaning that could change over time and not remain static.  Id. 
at 101.  One commentator later characterized this evolving, adaptable interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment as “an old, simple-minded Whig view that human history reflects 
progressive moral development.”  Eric Posner, The Eighth Amendment Ratchet Puzzle 
in Kennedy v. Louisiana, SLATE (June 25, 2008, 11:06 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2008/06/the-eighth-amendment-ratchet-puzzle-in-kennedy-v-louisiana.html [https://
perma.cc/4MEX-BSCB]. 
68. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 87. Denationalization is the administrative or legal practice of 
stripping an individual of his or her citizenship involuntarily.  Denationalization, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
69. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 87–88. The petitioner escaped from a military prison on 
an American military base in Morocco during World War Two.  Id. at 87.  He attempted 
to travel toward Casablanca, Morocco, and voluntarily surrendered himself to passing 
American military personnel.  Id. 
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punished the crime of desertion.70  The Court did not mention the broad
historical condemnation of disproportionate punishments, which did in 
fact inform the original rationale behind the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause.71  According to the Trop opinion, the Eighth Amendment precludes 
denationalization for desertion cases because the amendment’s interpretation 
should conform to society’s evolving standards and not remain static.72 
Eighteen years after Trop, the Supreme Court declared in Gregg that the 
Eighth Amendment could eliminate any punishment that did not conform 
to the evolving standards of decency.73  Here, the Court considered a defendant’s
appeal of his death penalty sentence for armed robbery.74  The evolving 
standards rule required that any analysis of cruel and unusual punishment 
should objectively incorporate the “public attitude toward a given sanction.”75 
The standards of decency permitted the death penalty as a constitutional
punishment, given contemporary legislation authorizing the death penalty
in thirty-five states, referenda upholding the practice, the frequency of
jury death penalty verdicts, and public opinion polling.76 
Expanding the evolving standards rule in Gregg, the Supreme Court 
simultaneously recognized that many punishments unavoidably involve 
pain, and these punishments are permissible under the Eighth Amendment 
provided that their infliction of pain was not unnecessary and wanton.77 
70. Id. at 101. 
71. Id. at 99–100.  The Court advocated an evolving standard because historical 
precedent narrowly confined the Eighth Amendment protections to punishments resembling 
torture. Id.  However, the English Parliament condemned Titus Oates’s punishment
primarily because it disproportionately punished perjury, and this condemnation likely 
inspired the Cruel and Unusual Clause.  See LEVY, supra note 22, at 236–37.  Condemnation 
of punishments for their asymmetry to the crime committed, as opposed to the pain they 
entailed, hails back to the Magna Carta in medieval England.  See Granucci, supra note 
34, at 845–46. 
72. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100–01. 
73. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1976) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment 
has not been regarded as a static concept. . . . [A]n assessment of contemporary values 
concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the 
Eighth Amendment.”). 
74. See id. at 158. 
75. Id. at 173.  In Gregg, the court relied on state statutes, state referenda, jury
verdicts, and public opinion polls to discern the public attitude.  Id. at 179–82.  In Trop, this 
analysis also incorporated international acceptance of a practice.  See Trop, 356 U.S. at 103. 
76. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–82.  After the Supreme Court temporarily struck
down the death penalty schemes of every state in Furman, thirty-five states enacted statutes 
formally authorizing the practice for various offenses to protect its use.  Id. at 179–80.  The 
Court also cited Gallup polls indicating 59% of Americans supported the death penalty.  
Id. at 181 n.25.  According to Gallup, support for the death penalty hit an all-time low of 
40% around 1967, but grew over 19% during the subsequent decade.  See Death Penalty, 
GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/PSU9-A5BL]. 
Today, 56% of Americans favor the death penalty for convicted murderers.  Id. 
77. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. 
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In Gregg, the Court referenced Justice Burger’s dissent from Furman v.
Georgia in arguing cruel and unusual punishments “involve the unnecessary 
and wanton infliction of pain.”78  However, evolving standards of decency
should inform the necessity of the practice.79  The original dissenting opinion 
from Justice Burger in Furman provided further that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits any punishment that resembles torture in its extreme cruelty.80 
In Gamble, the Court considered whether a prison’s lack of medical
attention to a prisoner’s back injury constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.81  First, the Eighth Amendment could apply to deprivations 
suffered during imprisonment apart from the specific sentence.82 Second,
the evolving standards of decency rule should determine whether the 
prison violated the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right when it deliberately 
ignored his medical complaints.83 Here, deliberate indifference to back pain
did violate the evolving standards of decency because twenty-two states 
had statutes providing for a standard of medical care for inmates.84 Gamble
did not cite contemporary public opinion polls, jury verdicts, or state 
referenda.85 
After Gamble, the Supreme Court held a wide variety of practices constituted
deliberate indifference and violated the Eighth Amendment.86 Wilson v.
78. Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392–93 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
79. Id.
 80. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 392–93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
81. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98 (1976). The plaintiff, an inmate of the
Texas Department of Corrections, sustained an injury during a “prison work assignment.” 
Id. at 98. 
82. See id. at 103–04. 
83. Id. at 106 (holding deliberate indifference to serious medical needs represented 
cruel and unusual punishment).  The Court also noted medical malpractice did not amount 
to an Eighth Amendment violation unless the actor was deliberately indifferent and the 
medical need was serious. Id.  Deliberate indifference is synonymous with recklessness 
or wantonness, requiring a conscious disregard of a known risk.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 
511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994). 
84. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103 n.8.  The regulations in a minority of states sufficed to
establish a new standard of decency with regard to prison conditions.  See id. 
 85. See id. at 103–04. 
86. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (finding that exposure to
tobacco smoke constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 
296 (1991) (holding overcrowding, excessive noise, and unsanitary conditions constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment, which did not require any personal, physical injury); Hutto 
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1978) (holding that overcrowding, lowered food rations,
the mixing of sick and healthy inmates, and general maltreatment, constituted cruel and 
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Seiter rejected the idea that the Eighth Amendment only applied to the 
wanton infliction of pain.87 Now, painless conditions like unsanitary and 
overcrowded prison cells or exposure to tobacco smoke could constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment.88  These cases rested on the assertion in
Gamble that societal standards could mature and place various medical 
conditions under the Eighth Amendment umbrella.89 
Beginning in the 1970s, American society soured on the idea of lenience 
toward drug addiction, as manifested in public opinion and legislation.90 
Few states elected to provide formal detoxification facilities, procedures,
and dedicated staff for addicted detainees.91 Given this sustained trend away 
from lenience, and the lack of legislation providing for accommodation of 
addicted detainees, several circuit courts remain reluctant to categorize 
addiction as a serious medical need, while the Supreme Court has not ruled 
92 on the topic.
In the 1990s, pharmaceutical companies and the medical community began 
to aggressively prescribe pain medication.93  Patients developed intense 
addictions to these medications, and the medical community failed to address 
unusual punishment); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 89–90 (2007) (finding a prison violated
the Eighth Amendment when it stopped an inmate’s hepatitis C treatment).
87. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 305–06 (holding that deliberate indifference to overcrowding,
excessive noise, insufficient locker space, inadequate heating and cooling, inadequate ventilation, 
unclean and inadequate restrooms, and unsanitary food preparation, could constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment). 
88. See id.; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35. 
89. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103–04. 
90. See War on Drugs, HIST. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/
crime/the-war-on-drugs [https://perma.cc/2TH4-PPQR]. In 1971, President Richard Nixon 
called drug abuse “public enemy number one.”  Id.  Contemporary Gallup polling found 
48% of Americans identified drugs as a serious problem.  Jennifer Robison, Decades of 
Drug Use: Data From the ‘60s and ‘70s, GALLUP (July 2, 2002), https://news.gallup.com/poll/ 
6331/decades-drug-use-data-from-60s-70s.aspx?version=print [https://perma.cc/UXZ5-
K4NE]. Subsequent measures involved increased funding for drug enforcement during 
the Nixon Administration, and mandatory sentencing guidelines during the Reagan
Administration. See War on Drugs, supra. The United States still actively combats drugs, 
particularly opioid addiction.  See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252. 
91. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252.  In 2016, Rhode Island became the first 
state to enact a medication-assisted treatment program for opioid-addicted detainees.  Id. 
at 253.  Connecticut and Vermont subsequently enacted similar programs.  Id. 
92. Compare Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding heroin addiction and withdrawal constituted a serious medical need such that 
deliberate indifference toward them was a form of cruel and unusual punishment), with 
Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding addiction 
to powerful painkillers did not constitute a serious medical need). 
93. See What Is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/9ZNZ-J722]
(last updated Sept. 4, 2019). 
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over-prescription and fraud.94  This phenomenon combined with other factors,
such as economic depression in certain communities and the availability 
of illicit opioids like heroin, to kill over 42,000 Americans in 2016 alone.95 
The opioid crisis will likely increase in severity, despite the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) classifying the crisis as a public 
health emergency in 2017.96  DHHS estimated 10.3 million Americans 
abused opioids in 2018, while 130 Americans die from an opioid overdose 
every day.97  Withdrawal symptoms often begin within twenty-four hours
after the last dose, and range from discomfort and vomiting, to high blood 
pressure,98 to death when they exacerbate a preexisting condition or cause 
the addict to commit suicide.99  As prisons and jails struggle to accommodate 
increasing numbers of addicted detainees, more cases like John’s will arise, 
necessitating a constitutionally sound and practical Eighth Amendment analysis 
to adjudicate them. 
IV. AN UNWORKABLE EVOLVING STANDARD
The evolving standards rule presents two problems: (1) courts use the
rule to disguise their own policy preferences as constitutional interpretation, 
coming to different conclusions when analyzing the same practice under 
the Eighth Amendment;100 and (2) societal standards can evolve in a direction 
that tolerates cruel and unusual punishments for certain detainees, or condemns 
practices well outside the Eighth Amendment’s scope.101 
94. See SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND: THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA’S OPIATE EPIDEMIC
137–38 (2015).
95. See What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, supra note 93. 
96. See Devitt, supra note 2 (finding increasing illicit opioid use may outweigh gains 
made from policies restricting prescription opioids); What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, 
supra note 93 (declaring a public health emergency in 2017). 
97. What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, supra note 93. 
98. See Withdrawing from Opiates and Opioids, HEALTHLINE, https://www.healthline.
com/health/opiate-withdrawal [https://perma.cc/95DN-PRJ6] (last updated July 12, 2019). 
99. See Estate of Abdollahi v. County of Sacramento, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1200 
(E.D. Cal. 2005).  The decedent in Abdollahi suffered from opioid withdrawals and committed 
suicide in his cell after a lapse in observation.  Id. 
100. Compare Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(finding addiction constituted a serious medical need), with Bruederle v. Louisville Metro 
Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding addiction did not constitute a serious 
medical need). 
101. See Usman, supra note 16, at 697–711.  Additionally, contemporary societal
standards can condone punishments that the Founders viewed as cruel and unusual when 
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A. Evolving Standards as an Unconstitutional Trojan Horse 
The Court provides inconsistent methods for ascertaining and applying 
society’s standards in Eighth Amendment cases.102  The seventy years of 
evolving standards cases since Trop reveal a pattern.  Throughout these 
cases, the Court chooses varying indicators of societal standards to arrive 
at its desired conclusion, or ignores the indicators altogether and relies on 
its own independent judgment.103  In this way, the evolving standards rule
allows the Supreme Court, and lower federal courts, to substitute their own 
policy preferences under the guise of constitutional interpretation.  Therefore, 
the evolving standards rule resembles a Trojan horse, disguising policy 
decisions as actual constitutional interpretation.104  The Supreme Court 
supplants Congress’s role as a policymaking body when it makes policy 
decisions without a precedential, statutory, or constitutional basis.105 
Before Trop, Eighth Amendment interpretation did not invoke contemporary 
societal standards of decency.106  When the Court handed down the Trop
they drafted the Eighth Amendment.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 340–45 (2002) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See discussion infra Section IV.A. Supreme Court rulings indicate a practice
can fall below society’s standards where a majority of states prohibit the practice, but also 
when a small minority of states prohibit the practice, indicating “how far beyond any 
cognizable constitutional principle the Court has reached to ensure that its own sense of 
morality and retributive justice pre-empts that of the people and their representatives.”  
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 124 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
103. Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87 (“The evolving standards of decency test is
inherently majoritarian, and is thus a poor protection for criminal offenders when public 
opinion turns against them.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has effectively replaced 
this test with an unfettered reliance on its own ‘independent judgment,’ with no external 
constitutional standard to guide its decisions.”).  In Graham v. Florida, the Court declined 
to use the evolving standards rule and based its authority on its own independent 
judgement. 560 U.S. at 61–62. 
104. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87.  Supreme Court cases like Graham and 
Atkins highlight the shift toward full reliance on independent judgment, without any guiding 
principles or doctrines.  See id.  Colwell provides an example of how the Trojan horse method 
has seeped into the lower courts.  See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 
2014).  Here, the Ninth Circuit invoked the evolving standards rule without actually 
analyzing society’s standards, then concluded the Eighth Amendment required medical 
intervention for an inmate’s painless, benign cataract.  See id. at 1063,1066–68. 
105. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 78.  The Constitution does not exist to “address 
all ills in our society.”  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
The Eighth Amendment should not function as a “National Code of Prison Regulation.”  
Id. 
 106. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (asserting for the first time in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence that “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”).  Before Trop, cruel 
and unusual punishments were those that disproportionately punished an offense, inflicted 
pain in a manner resembling torture, or caused death in a barbaric way.  See Wilkerson v. 
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878). 
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decision in 1958, it contained no references to domestic opinion polls, jury 
verdicts, or recent legislation.107  Instead, the Court focused on international
standards, where only two out of eighty-four countries imposed denationalization 
as a penalty for desertion.108  The Court claimed the international community 
almost unanimously rejected denationalization for any crime, but only 
cited countries that used the penalty for desertion.109  This formula looks
internationally to establish contemporary standards of decency, examining 
how other countries almost unanimously treat the specific crime.110 
After Trop, the Supreme Court declined to wield the evolving standards 
of decency as an effective rule, and narrowly applied the Trop holding in 
other denationalization cases.111  Between Trop (1958) and Gregg (1976),
the Court only wielded the evolving standards rule once, holding in 
Witherspoon v. Illinois that the practice of selecting jurors based on their 
approval of the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment.112  Here,
one domestic public opinion poll indicated 47% of Americans opposed 
the death penalty for convicted murderers, while 43% favored the practice.113 
The Eighth Amendment’s modern interpretation depended on the evolving
standards of decency, and public opinion polls demonstrated society’s
107. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101–04 (finding denationalization constituted “the total 
destruction of the individual’s status in organized society”). 
108. Id. at 103. Out of eighty-four countries, only the Philippines and Turkey punished 
desertion with denationalization.  Id. 
109. Id. at 102 (“The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.”). 
110. See id. at 102–03. 
111. See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 136–37 (1958) (holding the United 
States could not withhold citizenship from a former member of the Japanese army without 
proving voluntary service); Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384, 386–87 (1960) 
(holding collateral estoppel applied in a case involving an individual losing his citizenship 
after going to Mexico to flee the draft); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379 (1962) (holding 
a person denied citizenship for draft evasion need not sue the government through the 
procedures outlined in the Immigration and Nationality Act); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 186 (1963) (holding any statute divesting a citizen of his citizenship for 
leaving the country to avoid military service violated the procedural guarantees in the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments). 
112. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522–23 (1968).  The Court cited data 
indicating less than half of Americans approved of the death penalty, and held juries 
crucially imported these “community” values into the penal system, and the evolving 
standards of decency require this link.  Id. at 519–20. 
113. Id. at 520 n.16.  The International Review on Public Opinion poll found 47% 
opposed the death penalty, 42% favored it, and 11% were undecided.  Id. 
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rejection of the death penalty.114 Witherspoon ignored other reputable polls 
indicating significantly higher public support for the death penalty.115 
According to Justice White, the majority’s disdain for the death penalty
compelled it to engage in policymaking under the guise of dubious constitutional 
interpretation, instead of deferring to democratically elected legislators.116 
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Gregg, ironically described 
“evolving standards of decency” as an “oft-quoted phrase,”117 when the
Supreme Court only mentioned it once for substantive analysis during the 
eighteen years between Trop and Gregg.118  In 1976, Gregg discussed a
challenge to Georgia’s death penalty scheme, relying on a new methodology 
for determining the evolving standards of decency.119  Now Eighth 
Amendment meaning hinged on domestic public opinion polling, legislative 
enactments, and jury verdicts, as opposed to international norms.120  First,
two domestic public opinion polls showed between 57% and 59% support 
for the death penalty.121  Second, state referendums in Massachusetts and 
Illinois upheld the death penalty, thirty-five states enacted statutes providing 
for the death penalty, and Congress penalized airplane piracy with death 
in 1974.122  Third, juries infrequently imposed the death penalty when 
114. See id. at 519–20.  The Court found that public opinion rejected the death penalty,
and eliminating potential jurors based on their disapproval of the practice would create 
unrepresentative juries.  Id. 
 115. Compare Death Penalty, supra note 76 (indicating the death penalty enjoyed
54% support in 1967, a year before the Court decided Witherspoon), with Witherspoon, 
391 U.S. at 520 (describing death penalty supporters as a “distinct and dwindling 
minority”). 
116. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 542 (White, J., dissenting) (“If the Court can offer no
better constitutional grounds for today’s decision than those provided in the opinion, it 
should restrain its dislike for the death penalty and leave the decision about appropriate 
penalties to branches of government whose members, selected by popular vote, have an 
authority not extended to this Court.”). 
117. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (describing “evolving standards of 
decency” as an “oft-quoted phrase” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.86, 101 (1958)). 
118. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 n.15 (finding the evolving standards of
decency indicated society disapproved of jury selection based on death penalty opinion 
(quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101)). 
119. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 n.25. 
120. See id.
 121. Id. (citing Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death
Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1245, 1249 n.22 (1974)).  One Gallup poll from 1972 found 57% of 
Americans favored the death penalty, a stark increase from 42% cited in Witherspoon. Id. 
(citing Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra, at 1249 n.22).  A Harris survey from 1973 found 59% 
of Americans favored the death penalty.  Id. (citing Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra, at 1249 
n.22). 
122. Id. at 179–80 (first citing H.B. 212, §§ 2-4, 6-7 (Ala. 1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-452 to 13-454 (1973); ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-4706 (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§§ 190.1, 209, 219 (West 1976); 1974 Colo. Sess. Laws 52, § 4; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-
25, 53a-35(b), 53a-46a, 53a-54b (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1975); FLA.
470
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given the opportunity.123  While this statistic could indicate public disapproval
of the death penalty, the Court found infrequency only meant juries reserved 
capital punishment for the most severe crimes.124 Gregg discerned the
evolving standards of decency with several domestic indicators of majority 
public support for a particular practice, deriving Eighth Amendment meaning 
from this support.125 
In Gamble, the Court narrowly confined its analysis to legislative
enactments in a minority of states to discern the evolving standards of 
decency.126  Twenty-two states provided for a standard of medical care in 
prisons, indicating the evolving standards of decency now required Eighth 
Amendment protection in cases of deliberate indifference to serious medical 
STAT. ANN. §§ 782.04, 921.141 (West 1975–1976); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3102, 27-2528,
27-2534.1, 27-2537 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (1975); 38 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 9-1, 
1005-5-3, 1005-8-1A (1976–1977); IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1 (1975); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 507.020 (1975); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1976); MD. CODE ANN. § 27-413 (LexisNexis 
1975); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19, 97-3-21, 97-25-55, 99-17-20 (1975); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§§ 559.009, 559.005 (West 1976); MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-5-105 (1976); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§§ 28-401, 29-2521 to 29-2523 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1973); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 630:1 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-2 (1975); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 60.06 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 2929.02-2929.04 (LexisNexis 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.1-701.3 (1975– 
1976); 1974 Pa. Laws Act No. 46; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (West 1975); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-52 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2402, 39-2406 (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 19.03(a) (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206, 76-3-207, 76-5-202 (LexisNexis 
1975); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-31 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.045, 
9A.32.046 (1975); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (1975); and then citing Antihijacking Act of 
1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i), (n)).  A 1968 Massachusetts initiative upheld the death penalty, 
with 49% approving and 31% disapproving.  See id. at 181 n.25.  A 1970 Illinois referendum 
upheld the death penalty, with 64% approving and 36% disapproving.  See id.  After Furman 
struck down all death penalty schemes in the United States for their arbitrary nature, thirty-
five states enacted statutes reinstating the practice.  See id. at 179–80.  In 1974, Congress 
passed the Antihijacking Act, making airplane piracy a capital offense.  See Antihijacking 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, § 104, 88 Stat. 409, 411 (codified as amended 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1472(i)).
123. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.  Death sentence jury verdicts varied widely between
1961 and 1972, and only 20% of murder convictions resulted in the death penalty in states 
authorizing the practice.  Id. at 182 n.26. 
124. Id. at 182 (“[T]he relative infrequency of jury verdicts does not indicate rejection of
capital punishment per se.”). 
125. See id. at 187 (holding that the country’s “moral consensus” supporting the
death penalty helped indicate the practice was “not without justification and thus is not 
unconstitutionally severe”).  In Gregg, the Court’s chosen factors indicated a societal consensus 
supporting the death penalty, but in subsequent cases it struck down laws despite similar 
indicators of support.  See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87. 
126. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). 
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needs.127  This method rested on legislative enactments in a minority of 
states, and not international norms, domestic public opinion, or jury verdicts.128 
Sometimes, the Supreme Court ignores broad acceptance of a particular
condition or punishment, and declares evolving standards of decency 
necessitate its prohibition.129  In Graham v. Florida, the Court held life
sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders violated the Eighth Amendment 
despite broad authorization of the practice in the federal system, thirty-
seven states, and the District of Columbia.130  The 109 non-homicide
juvenile offenders serving life sentences at the time outweighed the broad 
legislative approval of the practice, even though the Court made the 
complete opposite finding in Gregg.131  In Atkins v. Virginia, the evolving
standards rule prohibited the execution of any mentally challenged person, 
when only seven of the thirty-eight states permitting capital punishment 
prohibited the entire practice.132  Therefore, when a practice complies with 
the wanton and unnecessary rule, and enjoys majority support under the 
metrics from Gregg, the Court may still invoke the evolving standards rule to 
prohibit it.133 
This approach acknowledges both the traditional wanton and unnecessary 
rule and the newer evolving standards rule, but applies neither.134  In these
cases, the evolving standards rule resembles a Trojan horse, disguising 
127. Id. at 103–05 (holding deliberate indifference to serious medical needs represented
cruel and unusual punishment). 
128. See id. at 103 n.8. 
129. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding the Eighth Amendment 
does not permit sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison for a non-homicide crime, 
despite broad acceptance of the practice).  Justice Thomas assailed this approach in his dissent 
in Graham. See supra note 102. 
130. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; see also id. at 97 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87.  Additionally, state legislation failed to indicate any trend 
toward prohibition.  Stinneford, supra note 11, at 88. Between 2002 and 2010, the 
Court made four similar counter-majoritarian declarations despite invoking the majoritarian 
evolving standards rule.  Id. at 87. 
131. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–67 (finding that the infrequency of life sentences
for juvenile defenders indicated society rejected the practice).  But see Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (“[T]he relative infrequency of jury verdicts does not indicate 
rejection of capital punishment per se.”). 
132. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
According to the Court, eighteen states prohibiting some executions of mentally challenged 
persons, with only seven states prohibiting the practice outright, constituted enough of a 
“national consensus” to compel its prohibition nationally.  See id. at 313–16, 342. 
133. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–67 (finding that because only 109 non-homicide
juvenile offenders were serving life sentences, the practice’s infrequence indicated a 
national consensus against it).  While the Court still invokes the authority from Trop and 
the evolving standards rule, “it no longer uses the test as a true ground for its decisions.”  
Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87. 
134. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87. 
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policy decisions as actual constitutional interpretation.135  The Supreme
Court oversteps its mandate and undermines state and federal legislatures 
when it makes policy decisions without a legal or constitutional basis.136 
B. The Danger of Adherence to the Majority 
Strict adherence to a majoritarian evolving standards rule, as demonstrated 
in Gregg, tethers Eighth Amendment understanding to society’s opinion 
about a practice at that moment in time.137  Deferring to society’s opinion 
cuts against the Supreme Court’s mandate as an anti-majoritarian institution 
that can protect unpopular positions and minorities.138 Society can become
(1) intolerant toward certain groups and condone their mistreatment;139 or 
(2) overly lenient toward certain groups and require their accommodation
135. Id. When the Supreme Court ignores both the Eighth Amendment’s original 
meaning and the evolving standards rule, and relies solely on its own independent 
judgement, it operates without any “external constitutional standard to guide its decisions.”  
Id.  The American scheme of ordered liberty relies on “uniformly applied legal principle” 
and not “ad hoc notions of what is right and what is wrong in a particular case.”  John M. 
Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, in THE 
EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUSTICE JOHN 
M. HARLAN 289, 291–92 (David L. Shapiro ed., 1969).  According to Justice Brennan, 
“[t]he principle that our Government shall be of laws and not of men is so strongly woven 
into our constitutional fabric that it has found recognition in not just one but several 
provisions of the Constitution.”  McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 252–53 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
136. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 95.  The Constitution does not exist to “address 
all ills in our society.”  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
The Eighth Amendment should not function as a “National Code of Prison Regulation.”  
Id.  When the judiciary makes decisions without a connection to any constitutional or legal 
principle, it simply substitutes its own policymaking agenda for that of democratically 
elected legislatures.  See supra note 102.  Justice Frankfurter argued the judiciary should 
refrain from policymaking because “[c]ourts are not representative bodies.  They are not 
designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society.”  Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
137. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186–87 (1976) (holding that society’s
opinion, as manifested in legislation, jury verdicts, and polling data, indicated a standard 
of decency that condoned the death penalty). 
138. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87.  Determining constitutional law based purely 
on policy preferences “runs contrary to basic principles of separation of powers.”  Id. 
139. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841–904).  Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1986, 
reflecting societal attitudes opposed to lenience for drug offenders.  See War on Drugs, 
supra note 90. 
 473
















     









well above constitutional standards.140  The late Justice Scalia summarized
these concerns when he said, “A Bill of Rights that means what the majority 
wants it to mean is worthless.”141  Drug addicts and inmates often find
themselves on the list of unpopular minorities, and depend on anti-majoritarian 
institutions like the Constitution and the Supreme Court to vindicate their 
rights, regardless of society’s lenient or punitive stance toward them.142 
The evolving standards rule, as it functioned after Trop, permits federal
courts to exclude addicted detainees from Eighth Amendment protection, 
even when their cases exhibit signs of cruel and unusual punishment. 
1. The Fallacy of Progressive Societal Standards
Society’s standards can evolve away from leniency.143  The evolving
standards rule emerged due to “overconfidence in the moral superiority of 
the present.”144 In reality, societal tastes rarely progress in a single direction 
and change quickly in response to events or new information about a 
topic.145  For example, movement toward leniency for prison conditions
during the late twentieth century mirrored a simultaneous movement in 
the opposite direction with regard to domestic and sexual violence.146  In
Kennedy v. Louisiana, the evolving standards rule required the elimination of 
capital punishment for child rapists.147  This decision focused on legislative
approval for the penalty as outlined in Gregg.148  Originally, eighteen states 
140. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) (“[T]he Constitution does 
not mandate comfortable prisons.”). 
141. Steven F. Hayward, Two Kinds of Originalism, 45 NAT’L AFFS. 146, 155 (2017). 
Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence demonstrates his fear of “unqualified majoritarianism” 
influencing constitutional interpretation. Id.  Justice Scalia’s warning echoed Justice 
Frankfurter’s Dennis concurrence: “History teaches that the independence of the judiciary 
is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume 
primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic, and social 
pressures.”  Dennis, 341 U.S. at 494 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
142. The Kansas-Nebraska Act is another example of the problems with unfiltered
majoritarianism.  See George F. Will, The Limits of Majority Rule, 28 NAT’L AFFS. 160, 
161 (2016).  Under the Act, Kansas and Nebraska could permit slavery with a majority 
popular vote. Id.  Abraham Lincoln opposed the Act because “there is more to America’s 
purpose, more to justice, than majorities having their way.”  Id. at 161–62. 
143.  See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 90. 
144.  See Usman, supra note 16, at 699. 
145. Id.
 146. Id. at 701. 
147. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419–21 (2008). 
148.  Id. at 422.  While the contemporary standards of decency would have permitted 
the death penalty for child rapists, the Court followed the principle that “their own
judgment will be brought to bear on issues when a national consensus is not clear” to reach
the desired outcome of prohibiting the practice. Matthew C. Matusiak, Michael S. Vaughn
& Rolando V. del Carmen, The Progression of “Evolving Standards of Decency” in U.S.
Supreme Court Decisions, 39 CRIM. JUST. REV. 253, 264–65 (2014). 
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and the federal government authorized execution of child rapists, and that 
number dropped to three states after Furman forced all states to reenact 
their death penalty statutes.149  While the decision left out public opinion 
polling, the other metrics indicated the political and judicial systems 
disfavored the practice.150  Given the strong public support for executing
child rapists, and the frequency with which societal values change, the 
evolving standards could easily permit the practice in the future.151  Basing
interpretation on the spirit of the moment runs afoul of the Constitution’s 
role as an enduring, principled document.152 
Public attitudes toward juvenile offenders soured during the 1990s, due 
to a moral panic around young “superpredators.”153 Highly publicized 
acts of juvenile violence combined with statistics predicting a 23% increase 
in the juvenile male population to generate public fears of a coming crime 
wave.154  American politicians and public figures invoked the “superpredator” 
concerns, and forty-five state legislatures moved to facilitate trying juvenile 
offenders as adults.155  Because societal attitudes toward this demographic
149. See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 422 (finding the last execution for child rape occurred 
in 1964).
150. See Usman, supra note 16, at 702 (finding that contemporary public polling 
strongly suggested broad public support for executing child rapists).  History follows 
a less “sequential and progressive path” toward leniency, and instead, “[c]yclic processes 
are far closer to the truth.”  STEPHEN P. HINSHAW, THE MARK OF SHAME: STIGMA OF MENTAL 
ILLNESS AND AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE 54 (2007). 
151. See Usman, supra note 16, at 702. 
152. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87–88.  Writing for the majority in West Virginia
v. Barnette, Justice Jackson argued, 
The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities 
and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts . . . . [F]undamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on 
the outcome of no elections. 
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
153. See PETER ELIKANN, SUPERPREDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN
BY THE LAW, at xi (1999). 
154. Id. at 24. The series of schoolyard murders in the late 1990s stoked public fears
about a coming crime wave.  See id. at 26, 29.  In reality, overall and juvenile crime decreased 
during this period, contrary to public fears around the topic.  Id. at 26. 
155. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 90.  During a televised discussion on the 1994
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, First Lady Hillary Clinton invoked the 
“superpredator” label for juvenile offenders.  See Allison Graves, Did Hillary Clinton Call 














      
  














     
evolved away from leniency during this period, as expressed in legislative
enactments, strict adherence to the evolving standards rule would have 
compelled the Court in Graham to uphold life sentences toward juvenile 
offenders.156 
American public opinion followed a similar pattern with regard to
drugs.  Beginning in the 1970s, American society assumed a punitive stance 
against drug use.157  This stance manifested in consistent public opinion 
and legislation severely punishing drug related crimes.158  In 1969, 48%
of Americans identified drug use as a “serious problem in their community.”159 
In 1986, 56% thought the United States did not spend enough on the war on 
drugs.160 In 1995, 63% still identified drug use as a serious problem, while 
31% called it a “crisis.”161  In 2018, drug convictions constituted 27% of the
overall criminal convictions in federal court, second only to immigration- 
related convictions.162  Much of the anti-drug legislation from this period
remains effective, although Congress recently reduced some punitive 
measures in 2010 and 2019.163 Few states enacted legislation providing formal 
detoxification facilities, procedures, and dedicated staff for detainees.164 
Accordingly, Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting various amendments 
followed society’s intolerance toward drug use.165 
156. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 90. 
157. See Robison, supra note 90. 
158. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the American public’s
hostility toward drugs beginning in the 1970s). 
159. See Robison, supra note 90. 
160. Id.
 161. Id.
 162. See Table D-4, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/ 
d-4/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2018/12/31 [https://perma.cc/MHT7-XULV]. 
163. See War on Drugs, supra note 90.  Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018, 
in part helping federal prisoners reduce their sentences with good behavior.  See Tim Lau, 
Historical Criminal Justice Reforms Begin to Take Effect, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 
25, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/historic-criminal-
justice-reforms-begin-take-effect [https://perma.cc/S3F9-STR7].
164. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252. 
165. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding the Controlled Substances 
Act, as applied to growers of marijuana for personal use, did not violate the Commerce 
Clause); Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (holding Oregon’s regulation of 
ceremonial ingestion of peyote did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Bd. of Educ. of 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002) (holding random drug tests of 
students participating in sports did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (holding a police officer’s observation from a helicopter of a 
partially covered marijuana greenhouse did not constitute a search under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
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Today, these attitudes persist around addiction,166 and the evolving standards
rule allows judges to inject into deliberate indifference cases their reservations 
about accommodating addicts.  Consequently, circuit court rulings diverged 
on whether addiction constituted a serious medical need, while the Supreme 
Court has not ruled on the topic.167  In Shaver v. Brimfield Township, 
an unpublished opinion, a U.S. district court in Ohio disregarded the high 
risk of pain and death for withdrawing detainees, finding addiction did not 
constitute a serious medical need.168  In Bruederle v. Louisville Metro 
Government, the Sixth Circuit found that despite the risks involved in cold 
turkey withdrawal, the intensity varied too often to designate withdrawal 
as a serious medical need.169  In Grayson v. Peed, the Fourth Circuit likewise
declined, arguing such a ruling would force officers to bring all suspects 
to the hospital instead of detention centers when they exhibited any signs 
of drug addiction.170  Providing Eighth Amendment protection for addicted 
detainees, the court added, “would be a startling step to take.”171 In Burnette 
v. Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit displayed identical reservations about medically 
evaluating addicted arrestees to determine the risk level.172 
Finally, the ruling in the unpublished case Estate of Hellman v. Kenton
County Jailer tellingly remarked, “[t]he day may yet come where a failure 
to have medical personnel evaluate a severely intoxicated detainee is deemed 
166. See, e.g., Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(finding addiction to powerful painkillers did not constitute a serious medical need). 
167. Compare Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding heroin addiction and withdrawal constituted a serious medical need such that deliberate 
indifference toward them constituted cruel and unusual punishment), with Bruederle, 687 
F.3d at 777 (finding addiction to powerful painkillers did not constitute a serious medical 
need). 
168. See Shaver v. Brimfield Township, No. 5:11 CV 154, 2014 WL 7506908, at 
*10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2014). 
169. See Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 773. 
170. See Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1999).  Such a ruling would 
instead compel jails to adopt detoxification facilities and procedures, and would not mandate 
hospital visits.  See Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 959 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (granting injunctive relief compelling the county jail to provide for detoxification 
procedures and staff). 
171. Grayson, 195 F.3d at 695–96.  Officers detained the decedent after observing
erratic and drug-influenced behavior and finding evidence he had ingested PCP.  Id. 
at 694.  After forcing the decedent to withdraw cold turkey, he resisted relocation from his 
cell and died after wrestling with officers.  Id. at 694–95. 
172. See Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The Constitution 
does not require an arresting police officer or jail official to seek medical attention for 
every arrestee or inmate who appears to be affected by drugs or alcohol.”). 
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Constitutionally deficient under the ‘deliberate indifference’ standard, but 
that day—should it arise—clearly lies in the future.”173  
2. Over-leniency and Judicially Mandated Comfort 
Strict adherence to evolving standards also risks judicially mandating 
“comfortable prisons.”174 Several cases demonstrate how adherence to
the majority risks an overly lenient Eighth Amendment interpretation that 
transforms the federal courts into a prison regulatory regime.175  Growing 
public sympathy for particular groups or concern for particular conditions 
could compel a federal court to enact publicly desired policy reforms, as 
demonstrated in Helling v. McKinney.176  Here, the Supreme Court held 
exposure to tobacco smoke constituted a serious medical need.177  Long term 
detrimental effects of exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke, combined with 
growing public concern around tobacco, indicated the Eighth Amendment 
should protect inmates from secondhand smoke.178  The analysis ignored
the likelihood of suffering and death, or how long this process would take, 
or the various issues with expanding Eighth Amendment protection to 
include all medically detrimental conditions.179  A wide variety of conditions
could plausibly lead to negative health defects, without causing any pain, 
suffering, or death in the short term.180 This vision of the Eighth Amendment
as a functional health code differs significantly from one restricted to 
more imminent, dangerous, and severe inflictions and deprivations.181 
173. Estate of Hellmann v. Kenton Cty. Jailer, No. 05–31–JGW, 2007 WL 1100730, 
at *9 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 12, 2007).  The evolving standards rule functions as it did in Graham, 
allowing the court to ignore actual constitutional analysis and substitute its own policy 
preferences.  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67–70 (2010). 
174.  Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). 
175.  See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 91. 
176.  See 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). 
177. Id.
 178. Id. at 36–37. 
179. Id. at 35–36. 
180. For example, conditions exposing detainees to asbestos fibers on a regular basis 
could eventually cause various forms of cancer. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, 
NAT’L CANCER INST. (June 7, 2017), https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-
prevention/risk/substances/asbestos/asbestos-fact-sheet#what-are-the-health-hazards-of-
exposure-to-asbestos [https://perma.cc/54YF-U65W] (“[T]hose who develop asbestos-related
diseases show no signs of illness for a long time after exposure.  It can take from 10 to 40 
years or more for symptoms of an asbestos-related condition to appear.” (citing AGENCY 
FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR ASBESTOS 49, 103 (2001), https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tox 
profiles/tp61.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2KT-BPEH].). 
181. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
the Eighth Amendment should not function as a “National Code of Prison Regulation”); 
see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981) (“[T[he Constitution does not 
478
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In the Ninth Circuit case Colwell v. Bannister, a detainee developed
cataracts in both eyes during his sentence, and the prison only had one of 
the cataracts removed.182  The remaining cataract did not cause pain, require 
urgent medical attention, or pose a risk of permanent vision loss.183 The
untreated cataract represented a serious medical need because (1) it affected 
the inmate’s daily activities and (2) a reasonable doctor would deem the 
injury “worthy of comment or treatment.”184  This rule casts a massive net 
to include any condition that could plausibly hinder a detainee, or earn a 
doctor’s “comment.”185  The Ninth Circuit’s rule completely circumvents 
the wanton infliction of pain requirement.186  Society might prefer prisons
repair inmates’ cataracts, but providing Eighth Amendment protection in 
this case opened the door to almost any medical condition. 
Decisions like Helling and Colwell, while perhaps reflective of societal
standards, dilute the Eighth Amendment’s meaning.  What began as a baseline
prohibition on the wanton infliction of pain now risks transforming into a 
powerful, court-driven regulatory tool to determine the finer points of
health policy in prisons.187 
Hypothetically, the reasoning from Helling and Colwell could extend 
Eighth Amendment protection to inmates with long-term mental or
emotional conditions. Long periods of detainment can cause detrimental 
mental health conditions like anxiety and depression.188  Prison subjects 
detainees to constant feelings of entrapment, detachment from family 
and friends, memories of their own acts, and fear of harm.189  A highly 
enclosed prison design could, perhaps, exacerbate these feelings.  Therefore, 
mandate comfortable prisons.”).  A more restricted Eighth Amendment analysis would set 
a clear minimum baseline for treatment and leave the finer points of prison regulation to
state legislatures. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 78. 
182. See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2014). 
183. Id.
 184. Id. at 1066–67 (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.
1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (en banc)).  The condition affected the inmate’s daily activities because it caused 
him to run into objects.  Id. 
185. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 91.  Many conditions worthy of a medical professional’s 
comment lack any pain or immediate negative health effects. 
186. Id.
 187. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 




















   
 
 
depression represents a condition worthy of a doctor’s comment, and a 
court in the Ninth Circuit could invoke the Eighth Amendment to protect this 
condition and compel a prison redesign.190 
A district court in the Ninth Circuit has already granted relief for an
inmate with a mental condition under a similar theory. The medical 
community identifies gender dysphoria, which involves a person expressing 
a different gender than their biological sex, as a medical condition.191  This
condition often involves anxiety, depression, and suicidal thoughts.192 
Some argue gender reassignment surgery represents a necessary medical 
remedy for this condition, in certain situations.193  It follows that the Ninth 
Circuit’s test would identify the condition as a serious medical need, and 
a prison’s refusal to provide the surgery would constitute deliberate 
indifference, i.e., cruel and unusual punishment. Faced with an inmate 
suffering from gender dysphoria, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California granted an injunction in Norsworthy v. Beard, 
compelling a prison to provide the surgery.194  The Ninth Circuit did
not review this decision because California released the plaintiff before the 
hearing, although some suggest it would have upheld the injunction.195 
McGuckin v. Smith enshrines this all-inclusive approach to determining 
serious medical needs and creates several problems in the process.  The 
Ninth Circuit in McGuckin established a formal test for evaluating serious 
medical needs, to provide for more consistency and less room for courts 
to substitute their own policy preferences.196  Under this test, a finding of
a serious medical need requires “[t]he existence of an injury that a 
reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment 
190. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding a 
serious medical condition is one worthy of a reasonable doctor’s comment), overruled on 
other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). 
191. See Victor J. Genchi, Comment, Sex Reassignment Surgery & the New Standard of
Care, 22 BARRY L. REV. 93, 93–94 (2016). 
192. Id. at 94. 
193. Id. (explaining how treatments for less severe forms of dysphoria include 
psychotherapy and hormone therapy, while gender reassignment surgery addresses more 
severe forms).  Gender reassignment surgery involves surgically reshaping genitalia to 
resemble those of the desired sex.  See Ross Toro, How Gender Reassignment Surgery Works 
(Inforgraphic), LIVE SCI. (Aug. 26, 2013), https://www.livescience.com/39170-how-gender- 
reassignment-surgery-works-infographic.html [https://perma.cc/G9HV-J55G].  Female-to- 
male reassignment costs over $50,000, while male-to-female reassignment costs between 
$7,000 and $24,000.  Id. 
 194. See Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1187, 1190, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(granting injunctive relief under an Eighth Amendment theory). 
195. See Genchi, supra note 191, at 95, 106. 
196. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in 
part on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc). 
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or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects 
an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial 
pain.”197  Several federal appeals courts adopted the McGuckin test or a 
similar version of it.198  These tests strike a balance between restricting
policy-based judicial intervention, and recognizing a constitutional duty 
to provide medical care for prisoners.  Only conditions acknowledged as
serious in the medical community have Eighth Amendment implications, 
theoretically replacing the court’s potential policy preferences with objective 
medical expertise.199 
In some cases, the McGuckin test succeeded in striking this balance
between restricting policy input and requiring care for inmates with severe 
needs. A Seventh Circuit decision categorized drug addiction as a serious 
medical need under its formulation of the McGuckin test.200  The Eighth 
Circuit came to the same conclusion with regard to a plaintiff’s inguinal 
hernia.201  Meanwhile, under the McGuckin test, the Fifth Circuit declined 
to categorize swollen wrists as a serious medical need,202 and the Eleventh 
Circuit similarly declined with regard to a shaving-induced sensitive skin 
condition.203 
197. Id.
 198. See Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a 
serious medical need was “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating 
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the 
necessity for a doctor’s attention” (quoting Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 
897 (6th Cir. 2004))); Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1371 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A] class 
of cases in which the medical condition involved, while far from life-threatening, is 
nevertheless sufficiently serious that the deliberately indifferent denial of medical care for 
such a condition . . . [is] fully capable of supporting an Eighth Amendment claim.”); Mata 
v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (requiring that the prisoner “produce objective 
evidence that the deprivation at issue was in fact ‘sufficiently serious’” as well as 
“evidence of the prison official’s culpable state of mind” (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 834 (1994))); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243–44 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(defining a serious medical need as “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as 
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize 
the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 
F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994))). 
199. See Loutfy, supra note 19, at 91. 
200. See Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005). 
201. See Johnson v. Lockhart, 941 F.2d 705, 706–07 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding plaintiff’s
inguinal hernia constituted a serious medical need). 
202. See Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1990). 
203. See Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 790 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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However, the McGuckin test presents several problems.  After adopting
versions of this test, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits declined to categorize 
addiction as a serious medical need.204  The Sixth Circuit declined to analyze
the pain and risk associated with drug addiction, and instead focused on 
policy, i.e., the potential burden on jail staff if the court designated drug 
addiction as a serious medical need.205 The Eleventh Circuit similarly
based its decision on the implications of requiring jail officials and police 
officers to seek medical attention for all drug-affected arrestees.206  Meanwhile, 
federal courts used the McGuckin test to grant Eighth Amendment protection 
for cases involving an infected toenail, a painful nasal condition, infected 
teeth, a broken hand, tobacco smoke exposure, and cataracts.207  None
of these conditions poses a substantial risk of death or suffering, and some 
completely lack pain as a symptom.  Because the McGuckin test provides 
Eighth Amendment protection for any condition a doctor could identify 
as requiring treatment, courts can wield the constitution as a general health 
code for nearly every condition.208 
The evolving standards rule and its arbitrary application reveal an 
inconsistent, unconstitutional, and unworkable method for evaluating 
cruel and unusual practices.209 Generally, domestic majority opinion 
determines the evolving standards of decency,210 except when the Court relies
204. See Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 773, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(finding opioid withdrawal did not automatically constitute a serious medical need because 
prison staff cannot predict withdrawal intensity); see also Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 
1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Constitution does not require an arresting police officer or 
jail official to seek medical attention for every arrestee or inmate who appears to be affected by 
drugs or alcohol.”).
205.  See Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 777. 
206. See Burnette, 533 F.3d at 1333. 
207. See Warren v. Fanning, 950 F.2d 1370, 1373–74 (8th Cir. 1991) (infected
toenail); Dace v. Solem, 858 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1988) (painful nasal condition); Fields 
v. Gander, 734 F.2d 1313, 1314–15 (8th Cir. 1984) (infected teeth); Bunton v. Englemyre, 557 
F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (broken hand); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)
(tobacco smoke exposure); Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1063–65 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(cataracts). 
208. See Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1072 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (“But McGuckin cannot 
be a correct reading of the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases, and unless we overturn it en 
banc, we will make ourselves the authors of a ‘National Code of Prison Regulation . . . .’” 
(quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting))). 
209. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87. 
210. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (declining to abolish the death 
penalty because of domestic majority approval manifested in public opinion polling and 
recent legislation). 
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on minority public opinion,211 its own independent judgment,212 or 
international norms.213  The Supreme Court would struggle to reconcile 
these different methods to a complex issue like detainee addiction, where 
gauges of public opinion, such as polls,214 jury verdicts,215 international 
norms,216 and legislative enactments,217 prove inconclusive or difficult to
apply.  Accordingly, lower federal courts struggle to categorize detainee 
addiction and withdrawals, with regard to the Eighth Amendment.218 
211. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (finding the evolving standards 
of decency required treatment for an inmate’s injury despite only twenty-two states providing 
for standards of care in prisons). 
212. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010) (deriving the evolving standards 
of decency from the Court’s “independent judgement”). 
213. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (assessing international citizenship
practices to determine the evolving standard of decency). 
214. See Illegal Drugs, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1657/illegal-drugs.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/93H6-YRQC]. When asked how much they blamed different causes for 
the opioid problem, respondents primarily blamed the pharmaceutical industry, doctors 
overprescribing pain medication, lack of public knowledge, and patients demanding 
painkillers, with 47% of respondents blaming patients “a lot.”  Id. 
215. See Table D-4, supra note 162.  In federal courts, guilty jury verdicts for drug
offenders decreased incrementally from 932 in 2008, to 426 in 2018.  See Table D-4 U.S. 
District Courts—Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and Major 
Offense (Excluding Transfers), During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2008, 
U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/D04Dec08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PGG-2X2V]; Table D-4, supra note 162. 
216. See UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME & WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
TREATMENT AND CARE FOR PEOPLE WITH DRUG USE DISORDERS IN CONTACT WITH THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 41 (2018), https://www.unodc.org/documents/UNODC_
WHO_Alternatives_to_Conviction_or_Punishment_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPW3-YWD8].
The UN provides an aspirational timetable for immediately evaluating and treating drug 
offenders after first contact.  Id.  Seven countries have implemented some form of 
medication-assisted treatment for opioid addicts.  See BEAU KILMER ET AL., CONSIDERING 
HEROIN-ASSISTED TREATMENT AND SUPERVISED DRUG CONSUMPTION SITES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 14 (2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2693.html [https://perma.cc/ 
88X7-SCFZ].
217. See ROBERT CHILDS, N.C. HARM REDUCTION COALITION, LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND NALOXONE UTILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 11, https://www.fda.gov/media/93172/ 
download [https://perma.cc/HVH7-94BT]. Out of around 18,000 police departments in
the United States, 577 carry naloxone, an emergency opioid overdose inhibiting drug.  Id.; 
DUREN BANKS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., NATIONAL SOURCES 
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT DATA 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J74M-YW9D]. Only Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Vermont enacted 
medication-assisted treatment programs for opioid-addicted detainees. See Linden et al., 
supra note 2, at 253. 
218. See Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding
opioid addiction constituted a serious medical need).  But see Bruederle v. Louisville Metro 
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C. Wanton and Unnecessary as a Constitutional and 
Practical Rule 
The problems with tethering Eighth Amendment understanding to 
society’s evolving standards of decency necessitate a new approach to
evaluating claims of cruel and unusual punishment.  This approach should
avoid trimming around the edges of Gamble and the factors for evaluating 
serious medical needs, and instead focus on the wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain. 
“Wanton” commonly means “unreasonably or maliciously risking harm 
while being utterly indifferent to the consequences.”219  Including wanton
as a modifier for infliction of pain captures the originally broad spirit behind 
the Eighth Amendment, in which the Founders had in mind affirmative 
tortures like hanging, drawing, and quartering, in addition to more passive 
tortures, like conditions on prison ships.220  Conditions on British prison 
ships subjected detainees to constant agony and death, and the consistent 
British policy of ignoring these conditions would render them just as 
liable under the Eighth Amendment as a prison utilizing the rack.221 
Requiring the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain or death 
brings together passive and active forms of torture under the Eighth 
Amendment.222  Justice Burger’s dissent in Furman argued that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits punishments similar to torture in their extreme 
cruelty.223  This rule appropriately encompasses the range of punishments
the Founders considered when writing the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause, without providing a blank check to courts seeking to categorize 
any deprivation of comfort as a form of cruel and unusual punishment. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s promulgation of the evolving standards 
rule, some courts still focus on the wanton and unnecessary infliction 
of pain, exemplifying a more constitutional and practical approach.224 
Meanwhile, retroactively applying this focus to past decisions further 
illustrates the rule’s benefits.225 
Gov’t, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding opioid withdrawal did not automatically 
constitute a serious medical need because prison staff cannot predict withdrawal intensity). 
219. Wanton, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
220. See LEVY, supra note 22, at 232; Compeau, supra note 24. 
221. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (recognizing that wanton and
unnecessary conduct includes deprivations); see also The HMS Jersey, supra note 23 (describing 
prison ship conditions). 
222. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 
223. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392–93 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
224. See discussion infra Section IV.C.1–2 (discussing Jones and Villarreal).
225. See discussion infra Section IV.C.3–4 (discussing Gamble and Colwell). 
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1. Jones: Enforcing the Limits of the Eighth Amendment 
The Florida Supreme Court followed this spirit in Jones v. Florida, 
providing a template of a modern Eighth Amendment analysis focused purely 
on wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.226  The Florida Supreme
Court invoked its “all writs” jurisdiction to hear the case, in which Leo Jones 
sought to preclude his electric chair execution under the Eighth Amendment.227 
The court found that the electric chair, when appropriately tested, did not 
violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.228  The Florida Supreme 
Court ignored the question of whether societal standards condoned the electric 
chair, and instead evaluated the necessity and degree of the pain involved 
in the practice.229  Like any method of punishment, the electric chair 
involves pain.230  However, the Constitution does not protect convicted
persons from “necessary suffering involved in any method employed to 
extinguish life humanely.”231  Here, the electric chair execution occurred 
as part of a carefully regulated process in which Florida tested its equipment 
and closely supervised the execution.232  This evidence did not indicate a 
wanton and unnecessary practice because Florida carefully regulated electric 
chair executions and they involved minimal, necessary pain.233  Despite
the Florida Supreme Court’s complete divergence from modern Eighth 
Amendment interpretation, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Jones’s petition 
for certiorari.234  While denial of certiorari does not automatically mean 
226. See Jones v. Florida, 701 So. 2d 76, 79–80 (Fla. 1997). 
227. Id. at 76. 
228. See id. at 79–80. The petitioner in Jones relied on a contemporary electric chair
execution that involved flame and smoke emanating from the apparatus.  Id. at 79. 
229. Id. at 79 (finding the national trend away from the electric chair should not influence 
its decision about the practice’s constitutionality).  The Florida Supreme Court sometimes 
focuses purely on the prisoner’s pain, suffering, and torture-like experience, without 
considering society’s preferences.  See Erin Schatz, Comment, Deliberate Indifference: Is 
There More to Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 51 FLA. L. REV. 171, 172 (1999). 
230. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79–80. 
231. Id. at 79 (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464
(1947)).  In Louisiana v. Resweber, the U.S. Supreme Court determined Louisiana could 
attempt a second execution after the first execution in the electric chair had failed.  See 
329 U.S. 459, 465–66 (1947). 
232. See Jones, 701 So. 2d at 79–80. 
233. Id. at 79 (“[T]h[e] record [was] entirely devoid of evidence suggesting deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s well-being on the part of state officials.”). 
234. See Timothy S. Kearns, Note, The Chair, the Needle, and the Damage Done: 
What the Electric Chair and the Rebirth of the Method-of-Execution Challenge Could 
Mean for the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 197, 212 
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the Supreme Court agreed with the ruling, it does mean at least six justices 
determined the Jones ruling did not warrant a review.235  
2. Villarreal: A Renewed Focus on Pain
In Villarreal v. County of Monterey, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California arrived at its conclusion fully relying on a 
wanton infliction of pain analysis, without mention of evolving standards 
or Trop.236  Here, law enforcement arrested the decedent, Lara Gillis, and 
quickly discerned that she suffered from drug addiction and mental illness 
and had preexisting injuries.237  As her condition deteriorated over the next
twenty-eight hours, she begged for help and exhibited outward signs of 
intense withdrawals.238  Despite officers noticing her condition during her
arrest and medical staff routinely observing her in the padded cell, Gillis 
received no medical care during her detainment and died at a hospital two 
weeks later.239 The jail subjected Gillis to immense suffering.  She exhibited
outward signs of suffering with her cries and moans, and medical analysis 
of her symptoms–drug withdrawal, organ failure, sepsis, low blood oxygen, 
and low blood sugar–indicates these conditions involve severe pain.240 
The Villarreal court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit’s division of 
deliberate indifference into subjective and objective components,241 
but ignored the broader McGuckin test.  The district court instead worked
from the premise that serious medical conditions are those involving serious 
pain and risk of death.242 McGuckin divided deliberate indifference analysis
(2005) (arguing that in Jones, the Florida Supreme Court “openly neglected” the evolving 
standards rule set out in Trop (first citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and then 
citing Jones, 701 So. 2d at 77–78)); see also Jones v. Florida, 523 U.S. 1014 (1998) (denying 
certiorari). 
235. See Stewart A. Baker, A Practical Guide to Certiorari, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 611, 
612 (1984). 
236. See Villareal v. County of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
237.  Id. at 1174. 
238. Id. at 1174–75. 
239. Id.
 240. Id.  Low blood oxygen and blood sugar can cause shaking, chills, dizziness,
Normal Blood Oxygen Levels: What to Know, MED. NEWS TODAY (Jan. 28, 2020), https:// 
migraines, seizures, difficulty breathing, and chest pain. See Joana Cavaco Silva, Low and 
www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/321044.php [https://perma.cc/6YP9-3RJQ]; Hypoglycemia 
(Low Blood Sugar), AM. DIABETES ASS’N, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes/medication-
management/blood-glucose-testing-and-control/hypoglycemia [https://perma.cc/6FQF-
43S3]. Abuse and withdrawal from stimulants like cocaine can cause cardiac arrhythmias,
cardiac arrest, strokes, and death.  See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
DRUGS OF ABUSE 51–52 (2017), https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/drug_of_abuse.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q52L-DLEE].
241. See Villarreal, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1181. 
242. Id.
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into two elements: “the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the 
nature of the defendant’s response to that need.”243 McGuckin noted, “[a]
serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 
could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain.’”244  For the first element, the Villarreal court cited the
characteristics of withdrawal as manifested in the present case, then for 
the second element, it cited the jail staff’s behavior.245  The district court 
also acknowledged the “seizures, hallucinations, agitation, and increased 
blood pressure” associated with drug withdrawal.246  Finally, the district 
court concluded, “[d]rug withdrawal constitutes a serious medical need 
requiring appropriate medical care under the Eighth Amendment.”247 
The Villarreal court analyzed the Monterey County Jail’s routine practice 
and the extent to which it wantonly inflicted pain and suffering on addicted 
detainees, and concluded the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment prohibited the practice.248  This analysis ignored the
historical considerations behind the Eighth Amendment, but the Founders 
familiar with the routine pain, suffering, and death involved in the mistreatment 
of detainees aboard British prison ships would agree the Amendment 
exists to prevent situations like that in Villarreal.249 
3. Gamble Revisited: Same Outcome, Better Rule
When a court focuses its analysis on the context and level or risk of
suffering placed on a detainee, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
still protects them in a wide variety of instances, suggesting courts need 
not rely on the “evolving standards of decency” rule.250  In Gamble, the 
plaintiff sustained an injury from a falling bale of cotton.251  He experienced 
243. Id.
244. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). 
245. Villareal, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1184–85. 
246. Id. at 1184 (quoting Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 
948 (N.D. Cal. 2015)). 
247. Id. (citing Pajas v. County of Monterey, No. 16-CV-00945-LHK, 2016 WL 
3648686, at *17 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016)). 
248. Id. at 1184–87. 
249. See Compeau, supra note 24. 
250. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
251. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 99 (1976). 
 487





























“intense” pain, and a doctor diagnosed his injury as a lower back strain.252 
The doctor provided pain medication and eventually cleared the plaintiff, 
despite the continued intense back and chest pain, high blood pressure, 
and migraines.253  The plaintiff’s supervisors ordered him to return to work, 
and when he refused, they placed him in solitary confinement.254  With 
full knowledge of the plaintiff’s condition, prison staff forced him to endure 
worsening pain for almost two months and threatened further punishment 
to coerce him to work.255 The prison intentionally initiated this punishment
outside the bounds of his actual sentence, and inflicted severe and enduring 
pain.256  Retroactively applying the Jones approach to Gamble still finds
the prison liable for cruel and unusual punishment because the pain was 
not minimal, and it was not a necessary part of his scheduled punishment.257 
Such behavior fell within the range of the original concerns behind the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, and within the meaning of the 
wanton and unnecessary rule.258 
If only three states provided for prison standards of medical care in 1976, 
instead of the actual number of twenty-two, strict adherence to the evolving 
standards rule may have sanctioned the prison’s conduct in Gamble. 
Despite the fact that a prison forced a detainee to perform manual labor 
with a severely painful back condition, the requisite societal standards 
would not have sufficiently evolved.259  The Supreme Court followed this
strict adherence in Gregg, upholding the death penalty because of its wide 
legislative approval.260  Meanwhile, ignoring the evolving standards rule
and using “independent judgment” to make the same ruling invokes 
constitutional issues involving the separation of powers.261 The forced 
prison labor represented cruel and unusual punishment because the prison 
consciously disregarded the risk of exacerbating the plaintiff’s severe back 
condition, and consciously ignored his repeated requests for help or 
252. Id. at 99. Lower back strains involve radiating pain, stiffness that restricts range 
of motion and posture, muscle spasms, and persistent pain.  See Low Back Strain and 
Sprain, AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS, https://www.aans.org/Patients/Neurosurgical-
Conditions-and-Treatments/Low-Back-Strain-and-Sprain [https://perma.cc/6JM9-D3BU].
Doctors recommend avoiding strenuous activity, which will exacerbate the injury and 
cause more severe pain.  See Kojo Hamilton, Pulled Back Muscle and Lower Back Strain, 
SPINE-HEALTH (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.spine-health.com/conditions/lower-back-pain/
pulled-back-muscle-and-lower-back-strain [https://perma.cc/D6HN-9FY2].
253. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 99–101. 
254. Id. at 100. 
255. Id. at 100–01. 
256. Id.
 257. See Jones v. Florida, 701 So. 2d 76, 79 (Fla. 1997). 
258. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135–37 (1879). 
259. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105–06. 
260. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–82 (1976). 
261. See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 87. 
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reassignment.262  The objectively severe pain involved in the prison’s choice, 
and the prison’s culpable mental state, could have appropriately guided 
the Court’s analysis. 
4. Colwell: Avoiding Judicially Mandated Comfort 
This focus on wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain would preclude 
certain conditions from Eighth Amendment protection.263  Retroactively 
applying the Jones approach to Colwell, the prison satisfies the subjective 
mental state requirement of wantonness, because the inmate repeatedly 
requested care for his other eye and the prison consciously denied these 
requests.264  While the case would still hinge on whether this deprivation 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the absence of any severe pain 
or life-threatening danger indicates the prison’s conduct conformed to 
Eighth Amendment standards.  When the prison denied the inmate’s requests 
for a second surgery, the inmate continued his incarceration without pain, 
the risk of pain, or even the possibility of permanent vision damage.265 
Walking about a prison without full use of an eye differs significantly
from forced manual labor with a painful back condition, as described in 
Gamble.266  The Ninth Circuit could reasonably conclude the prison’s
neglect of this plaintiff’s particular condition did not constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
V. SOLUTION
This Comment proposes a solution to reconcile the applicability and
constitutionality of Wilkerson with the concerns of Trop. The proposal 
returns the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to the original dichotomy 
described in Wilkerson, but with the understanding that any active or passive 
practice can resemble torture in its wanton and unnecessary infliction of 
pain or exposure to a substantial risk of death.  The Supreme Court would
have the opportunity to enact this solution after granting certiorari to a 
lower court decision on cruel and unusual punishment. 
262. See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 100–01. 
263.  See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2014). 
264.  Id. 
265.  Id. at 1063, 1071. 
266.  See Gamble, 429 U.S. at 99–101. 
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A. Proposed Analytical Framework 
This Comment’s solution would conduct cruel and unusual analysis in 
the following manner: A particular practice constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment if it involves the wanton infliction of severe pain or death.267 
Arbitrary, unregulated, drawn out, and inconsistent processes wantonly 
inflict pain.268  Any pain resembling torture in its severity represents 
unnecessary pain.269  The Eighth Amendment prohibits the active, affirmative 
infliction of severe pain,270 and passive infliction of severe pain through 
deprivation.271  Depriving a detainee of medical care for a serious medical 
need only constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when doing so results 
in the wanton infliction of severe pain.272 Wanton, reckless, or deliberately
indifferent conduct satisfies the subjective mental state requirement for 
cruel and unusual punishment cases.273 
B. Overruling the Evolving Standards Rule 
Cruel and unusual analysis relying solely on the wanton and unnecessary 
infliction of pain overrules Trop in eliminating the evolving standards 
rule.274  The Supreme Court adheres to its own precedent under the doctrine
of stare decisis, but recognizes that this doctrine does not represent an 
“inexorable command.”275  The Court has identified several factors when
267. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (“First, the punishment must 
not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 392–93 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))). 
268. See id. at 188, 206–07 (finding Georgia’s sentencing scheme sufficiently reduced
the possibility of arbitrary and capricious punishments to pass constitutional muster). 
269. See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879). 
270. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (holding unnecessary prison
beatings constituted cruel and unusual punishment even when they did not result in serious 
injury). 
271. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (recognizing that wanton and
unnecessary conduct includes deprivations); see also Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104 (finding 
that deliberately depriving detainees of medical care for serious medical needs constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment). 
272. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992). 
273. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–38 (recognizing that the definition of “deliberate 
indifference” is consistent with the definition of recklessness or wanton under the criminal 
law, which holds a person accountable when he “disregards a risk of harm of which he is 
aware”). 
274. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (“[T]he [Eighth] Amendment must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”). 
275. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)). 
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considering whether to overrule its own precedent.276  These factors include: 
“the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other 
related decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and 
reliance on the decision.”277 
The problems facing the evolving standards rule from the Trop decision 
fall into each of these categories.  The decision contained flawed reasoning, 
namely that societal standards evolve in a continuously lenient or progressive 
direction, and that courts can consistently deduce these standards through 
objective indicators like public opinion polling.278 The evolving standards
rule from the Trop decision proved unworkable as the Court struggled to 
apply it consistently and sometimes ignored it outright.279  The decision 
contradicts precedents like Wilkerson and the constitutional separation of 
powers.280 Since the Trop decision, societal standards evolved away from 
leniency for drug users, demonstrating societal standards do not reliably 
evolve toward leniency for all classes of detainees.281  Trop did not create
“a clear or easily applicable standard,” indicating “arguments for reliance 
based on its clarity are misplaced.”282  The evolving standards rule from
the Trop decision may provide cover for jails and prisons that force addicted 
detainees to withdraw cold turkey, indicating some level of reliance, but 
these public institutions can readily reverse these policies with appropriate 
changes in procedure.283  These arguments provide the necessary legal
basis for overruling Trop. 
276. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478– 
79 (2018).
277. Id.
 278. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1. 
279. See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
280. See discussion supra Section IV.A.1. 
281. See discussion supra Section IV.B.1. 
282. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484 (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 
2080, 2098 (2018)) (acknowledging a rule’s clarity could strengthen the reliance argument 
in favor of the rule’s preservation); see also discussion supra Part IV (arguing courts 
inconsistently apply the evolving standards rule, relying on different factors and using the 
rule’s ambiguity to decide cases based on their policy preferences). 
283. See Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 959–60 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (outlining procedural changes to adequately treat detoxifying detainees); see also 
Trickey, supra note 4 (finding Rhode Island’s successful medication-assisted treatment 
program in its prison system costs the state $2 million annually). 
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C. Addressing Potential Challenges 
This solution would expand the umbrella of cruel and unusual punishment 
to cover any practices that deliberately ignore objectively high levels of 
pain or life-threatening conditions. It would also retract the umbrella of 
cruel and unusual punishment from practices lacking any severe pain or 
life-threatening conditions.284  One criticism of the new formulation would
point out that the new umbrella provides substantial latitude for courts to 
place a bevy of new conditions under Eighth Amendment protection.285 
It would seem the new formulation simply replaces one mechanism for
inserting policy preferences—the evolving standards rule—for another. 
This line of criticism ignores the constraints that the proposed solution 
places on courts, compared to the present approach.  First, a court could 
not pick and choose favorable societal indicators to arrive at a desired outcome, 
because the solution scraps the evolving standards rule.286  Eliminating
the evolving standards rule and providing a specific legal analysis would 
also prevent a court from inserting its independent judgement when 
societal indicators point toward an undesirable outcome.287  Second, the
proposed solution excludes deliberate indifference to conditions causing 
less than severe pain or a substantial risk of death.  Under this solution, 
a court would be hard pressed to extend Eighth Amendment protection in 
cases that fail to clear the threshold of severe pain or risk of death, such 
as those featuring mere discomfort, aches, deficient sanitation, nuisances, 
inconveniences, and elective procedures.288  Courts could not wield the
McGuckin test, where any condition “that a reasonable doctor or patient 
284. See discussion supra Section IV.C.2. 
285. A different proposed solution argues that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause originally meant “contrary to long usage,” and only a return to this original meaning 
will sufficiently constrain judicial policymaking and insulate the Eighth Amendment from 
public opinion.  See Stinneford, supra note 11, at 89–90.  This formulation would compel 
courts to enforce longstanding practice, without making value or policy-based assessments 
of a punishment’s seriousness.  Id.  The Eighth Amendment would prohibit life sentences 
without parole for juveniles simply because those sentences became common during the 
1990s and contradicted longstanding practice.  Id. at 90.  Courts favored this approach in 
the years following the American founding.  See Barker v. People, 20 Johns. 457, 459 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (upholding a state statute depriving convicted duelers of their right 
to vote because it conformed to longstanding practice), aff’d, 3 Cow. 686 (N.Y. 1824); 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. (1 Call) 555 (Va. 1799) (striking down a joint fine imposed 
on four defendants convicted of assaulting a magistrate because joint fines violated the 
longstanding ban on punishing one for the wrongdoing of another). 
286. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519–20, 520 n.16 (1968) (citing a 
favorable death penalty poll while ignoring contemporary reputable polls showing much 
higher support). 
287. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010). 
288. See discussion supra Section IV.C.2. 
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would find important and worthy of comment or treatment” or any “condition 
that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities” would receive 
Eighth Amendment protection.289  Third, this solution maintains the mental
state requirement of recklessness, wantonness, and deliberate indifference.  
Negligent or accidental failures to identify or address conditions would not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.290 
Capital punishment would pose an immediate challenge to this new
cruel and unusual analysis.  In previous Supreme Court cases, the evolving 
standards rule protected capital punishment, because the American body 
politic widely approved of the practice.291  This Comment’s formulation 
eliminates this protection for capital punishment, but it does not eliminate 
the rules for limiting capital punishment only when arbitrarily applied or 
involving a lingering death.  Furman temporarily struck down capital
punishment because of its widespread unregulated and arbitrary application.292 
Scheduled capital punishment, when applied in a regulated regime without
risk of a lingering death, conforms to the original spirit behind the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause, and this Comment’s solution.293  Death 
violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in the context of unscheduled 
capital punishment, resembling the death of Lara Gillis in Villarreal,294 or 
in the context of arbitrarily applied capital punishment, resembling the 
plaintiff’s treatment in Furman,295 or when it subjects one to a lingering 
289.  McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992). 
290. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–38 (1994). 
291. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–83 (1976) (finding legislative activity,
jury verdicts, and public opinion indicated the standards of decency condoned the death 
penalty).
292. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). 
293. Id. at 242–43 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“There is evidence that the provision 
of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which the language of the Eighth Amendment 
was taken, was concerned primarily with selective or irregular application of harsh 
penalties and that its aim was to forbid arbitrary and discriminatory penalties of a severe 
nature . . . .” (citing Granucci, supra note 34, at 845–46)).  Under one historical theory, 
the replacement of Saxon with Norman law in eleventh century England brought an end 
to the emphasis on consistency and proportionality between crime and punishment, 
necessitating the return to this emphasis in the Magna Carta.  See Granucci, supra note 34, 
at 845–46. 
294. See Villareal v. County of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174–75 (N.D. Cal. 
2017).
295. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153–54 (“[W]here this court held to be violative of those 
Amendments death sentences imposed under statutes that left juries with untrammeled 
discretion to impose or withhold the death penalty . . . .” (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40)). 
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death, i.e., pain outside of the “necessary suffering involved in any method 
employed to extinguish life humanely.”296  
D. Complying with the New Rule 
Under the solution offered in this Comment, reckless, deliberately 
indifferent, or wanton failures to treat detainee addiction and withdrawal 
will often constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  States can respond to 
this change with legislation providing for adequate detoxification procedures, 
facilities, and staff in state prisons and jails.297  Processing potential addicts
and ensuring their detainment does not subject them to suffering and risk of 
death requires (1) timely, professional medical evaluation; (2) monitoring; 
and (3) immediate and sustained pharmacological treatment.298  Different 
types of addiction require different protocols for adequate assessment.299 
Over 50% of inmates in prisons and jails depend on or abuse drugs in 
some way.300  Opioid abuse accounts for an increasing share of addiction 
in the United States, and an estimated 42,000 Americans died from opioid 
abuse in 2016.301  Consequently, about 25% of the country’s inmates depend 
on or abuse opioids.302  The literature suggests prisons adopt medication-
assisted treatment (MAT) for opioid withdrawal,303 to avoid tragic cases 
like Estate of Abdollahi v. City of Sacramento.304  MAT involves administering
“opioid agonists” like methadone and buprenorphine-naloxone.305  These
chemicals counteract the dangerous effects of withdrawal and suppress 
powerful opioid cravings.306 
296. Jones v. Florida, 701 So. 2d 76, 79 (Fla. 1997) (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947)); see also In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) 
(finding punishments are cruel and unusual when they involve a “lingering death”). 
297. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 261–62. 
298. See Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 959–60 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (granting injunctive relief providing for adequate detoxification treatment for detainees). 
299. Id. at 960. 
300. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252. 
301.  Id. 
 302. See Trickey, supra note 4.
303.  See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252.  Inmate deaths most often occur during 
the days immediately following booking, with drugs and alcohol playing a significant
role. See COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., supra note 6, at 2–3. 
304. See Estate of Abdollahi v. County of Sacramento, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1200 
(E.D. Cal. 2005) (finding the decedent suffered from opioid withdrawal and committed 
suicide in his cell after a lapse in observation). 
305. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 252. 
306. Id.  Inmate deaths due to overdoses and withdrawal from drugs and alcohol are 
preventable when prisons adopt reforms like providing MAT.  See COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., 
supra note 6, at 2–3. 
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Experimental statewide MAT programs have not proven overly burdensome
or difficult to implement.  In 2016, Rhode Island enacted a program that 
provided MAT and drug abuse counseling throughout its prison system.307 
This program costs Rhode Island $2 million annually and successfully 
reduced the number of overdose deaths in the state’s prison population.308 
Enacting this program helped the state prison system comply with Eighth 
Amendment standards, at a relatively low cost. 
VI. CONCLUSION
C.S. Lewis described pain as a “megaphone to rouse a deaf world” that 
“shatters the illusion that all is well.”309  The human body’s rejection of pain
represents a timeless measuring tool for cruelty because it speaks, and 
often shouts, for itself.  Certain practices, from beatings, to forced labor 
with a back injury, to drug withdrawal, will always create objectively high 
levels of suffering, regardless of society’s contemporary standards.  Society’s 
feelings about these high levels of pain may change, condoning it for some 
groups and rejecting it for others, but pain still speaks for itself, vocally 
demanding redress like the decedent’s cries for help in Villarreal.310  The
constitutional implications of this pain should turn on its severity, without 
the secondary question of whether society condones this severity.  The 
proposed solution eliminates the evolving standards rule and restricts cruel 
and unusual punishment to practices causing severe pain or the substantial 
risk of death.  The Supreme Court should promptly correct its cruel and 
unusual analysis and return to a practice consistent with the original spirit 
behind the Eighth Amendment. 
307. See Linden et al., supra note 2, at 261–62.  Rhode Island provides immediate 
assistance to withdrawing detainees and long-term assistance to facilitate reintegration 
with society.  See Andrea Hsu & Ari Shapiro, Rhode Island Prisons Push to Get Inmates 
the Best Treatment for Opioid Addiction, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 19, 2018, 2:13 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/11/19/668340844/rhode-island-prisons-
push-to-get-inmates-the-best-treatment-for-opioid-addiction [https://perma.cc/T3HG-MLPL].
308. See Trickey, supra note 4.  After a spike in drug overdoses statewide, Rhode 
Island’s legislature “easily” passed the bill instituting MAT in state prisons.  See Linden 
et al., supra note 2, at 261.  In 2016, before instituting the reforms, twenty-six inmates died 
from drug overdoses, while only nine died the following year.  See Trickey, supra note 4. 
 309. C. S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 81, 83 (1944). 
310. See Villareal v. County of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1174–75 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). 
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